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Research Radar, October 15, 2026: 13 new AI and security papers to know

The most relevant new AI and security research from Nature & arXiv, with the authors' own summaries and links to the papers.

13 papers, Nature & arXiv

New research on AI and security, selected for relevance to language models, AI agents and cybersecurity. Summaries are the authors’ or publisher’s own words, linked to the original.

Peer-reviewed

New preprints (not yet peer-reviewed)

AgentCIScope: Grounded Contextual Integrity Evaluation for LLM Agents

arXiv · Chengquan Guo, Zhaorun Chen, Zinan Lin, Xiaodong Liu, Bo Li

LLM agents are becoming increasingly capable of handling daily workspace tasks by interacting with application environments through tool calls. However, as agents read and write sensitive user data across email, documents, and other applications, a central privacy question is whether they preserve contextual integrity (CI), that is, whether the information flows they produce comply with context-specific disclosure constraints.

EvoSafeHarness: Evolving Model- and Domain-Specific Harnesses for Securing Agents

arXiv · Nanxi Li, Yingzi Ma, Yulong Cao, Chong Xiang, G. Edward Suh, Bo Li, Yejin Choi, Dawn Song, Chaowei Xiao

Large language model (LLM) agents can translate natural-language requests into real-world actions, creating safety risks from both indirect prompt injections and directly harmful requests. Existing system-level safety harnesses are typically designed by experts and applied across heterogeneous models and domains, despite substantial differences in model behavior, utility tolerance, and domain-specific safety requirements.

CyberArena: Benchmarking AI Agents in Live Symmetric Attack-and-Defense Combat

arXiv · Bangya Liu, Jianhong Tu, Yueyang Pan, Hanhong Zhao, Zhe Ye, Hongwei Li, Saastha Vasan, Katherine Lambert, Junmin Zhu, Hao Wang, Jienan Chen, Yunze Xiao, Minglai Yang, Zihan Wang, Hairong Yin, Hao Wang, Zhiwen Fan, Tianneng Shi, Zhun Wang, Chenguang Wang, Dawn Song

AI agents are demonstrating increasingly strong offensive and defensive cybersecurity capabilities in the real world. Current benchmarks mostly evaluate agents in isolation against static targets.

P2Patch: Exploit-Guided Vulnerability Repair

arXiv · Mohsen Iranmanesh, Sina Moradi Sabet, Sina Marefat, Ali Javidi Ghasr, Maxime Newman Nereyabagabo, Kousha Amouzesh, Jaivir Malhi, Vinci Velasco, Alex Chung, Mohammad A. Tayebi

Large language models are increasingly deployed as autonomous agents for automated program repair, patching software vulnerabilities through multi-step reasoning and tool use. Yet these systems typically validate a patch against the same evidence used to construct it — a static alert, sanitizer trace, published exploit, or test suite.

Natural Code Transformation Confuses Agents in Vulnerability Analysis

arXiv · Jie Zhu, Ronik Bhaskar, Heather Zheng, Ben Y. Zhao, Kexin Pei

Having demonstrated a strong potential for automating vulnerability discovery, AI agents can also be used to attack software systems at scale. Today's software systems need mechanisms to level the playing field by slowing down potential attacks, giving them time to patch vulnerabilities and strengthen software.

Cooking Up Risks: Benchmarking and Reducing Food Safety Risks in Large Language Models

arXiv · Weidi Luo, Xiaofei Wen, Tenghao Huang, Hao Li, Hongyi Wang, Zhen Xiang, Chaowei Xiao, Kristina Gligori'c, Muhao Chen

Food safety directly affects human health in daily life, as unsafe preparation or storage can lead to contamination and foodborne illness. PwC's 2025 consumer survey reports that 47% of respondents are comfortable using generative AI for meal planning, highlighting the need for safe food-related assistance.

MMA-SafetyBench: A Benchmark for Multimodal Agent Safety Evaluation

arXiv · Yuke Wang, Benlei Cui, Shen Pang, Xuemei Dong, Longtao Huang, Hui Xue, Yuwen Zhai, Junjie Li, Jingqun Tang, Haiwen Hong

Multimodal agents increasingly rely on visual interfaces to perceive state and select actions, creating an attack surface not captured by text-only safety evaluations. We study Visual Semantic Hijacking, in which deceptive but semantically meaningful interface elements, such as forged system alerts, cause an agent to depart from its authorized task.

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